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I. INTRODUCTION
One definition of universal service is the provision of a baseline level
of telecommunications services to every resident of a country at a
reasonable charge.' Such a definition, of course, begs the questions of what
constitutes a baseline level and what is included in telecommunications
services. In the United States, the concept of universal service slowly
developed over time. Recent regulatory decisions and technological
changes are driving changes in the concept of, and the regulatory
mechanisms designed to achieve, universal service. One of the critical
changes in universal-service concepts (and customer demands) is toward
greater reliance and value derived from mobile communications and
broadband Internet connections.2
The current interstate universal-service mechanism designed by the
FCC provides approximately $4.3 billion annually to high-cost
telecommunications providers alone (i.e., not including funding for low-
income consumers, schools, and healthcare facilities).3 Federal universal
service support in total requires an 11.4 percent tax on interstate
telecommunications end-user services.4 One concern expressed by the FCC
is that "[c]ompetitive ETC [eligible telecommunications carrier] support, in
the six years from 2001 through 2007, has grown from under $17 million to
$1.18 billion-an annual growth rate of over 100 percent."5
Early in its history, the FCC (created in 1934) was primarily
concerned with reducing interstate long-distance charges.6 A system to help
keep the prices of local (especially residential) services low by transferring
significant funds from interstate long-distance carriers developed only
1. WTO: Telecommunication-Glossary of terms, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
serv_e/telecome/tel 12 e.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
2. Broadband Internet connections are important to modem concepts of universal
service, but are beyond the scope of this Article. We treat this topic in a different
manuscript. See Steve G. Parsons & James Bixby, Broadband and Wireless Technologies:
Critical to a New Universal Service Paradigm? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
3. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Order on Remand & Report & Order &
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 6475, para. 33 (2008) (citing
UNIVERSAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2007)).
4. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission Releases Study on
Telephone Trends (June 21, 2005).
5. High-Cost Universal Service Support, supra note 3, at para. 33.
6. See Milton L. Mueller, Jr., Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and
Monopoly in the Making of the American Telephone System 158 (1997).
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slowly from 1952 until 1970. This revenue/cost pattern was so well
established by the mid-i 970s that the seminal formal work in economics on
cross-subsidies began in the telecommunications industry.
8
Given the historical growth of landline 9 telecommunications
infrastructure, the concept of interconnecting citizens had the practical
implication of seeking to place landline infrastructure to interconnect
locations where citizens spent most of their time: homes and businesses.
While the essence of virtually all universal-service concepts is that citizens
be interconnected to a communications network, ideas regarding the
method of connection have changed over time.
The 1934 Communications Act has been altered only once-by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.10 With respect to universal service, the
Telecommunications Act" (1) established a process to define supported
services via a Federal-State joint board and FCC proceeding; 12 (2)
established principles for universal service; 13 (3) noted that "[u]niversal
service is an evolving level of telecommunications services"; 14 and (4)
required that "interstate telecommunications services shall contribute [to
universal service] on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis" (although
it provided no new mechanism for funding). 15
Notably, since 1997, the FCC has explicitly permitted federal funding
for the achievement of universal service to be portable to other
technologies; 16 in particular, this has meant that wireless carriers may be
7. See id. at 159-60.
8. See Steve Parsons, Cross-Subsidization in Telecommunications, 13 J. REG. ECON.
157, 161 (1998) (citing Gerald Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public
Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 966 (1975) as the first mathematically formal treatment of
cross-subsidy, and noting prior and subsequent work also largely in the telecommunications
industry). See also BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PRICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 118-36 (1991).
9. "Landline" or "wireline" refers to a telephone line that travels over terrestrial
circuits, as opposed to "wireless," "mobile," or "cellular," which refers to
telecommunications devices and services that use radio waves as a medium for
transmission.
10. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of title 47 of the U.S. Code).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2008); see also id. at § 254(h)(1)(A)-(B) (providing support for
healthcare providers and schools and libraries in rural areas).
12. Id. § 254(a)(1).
13. Id. § 254(b).
14. Id. § 254(c)(1).
15. Id. § 254(d).
16. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 Fed.
Reg. 11580 para. 2 (2008) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 32, 36, 54) (citing Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Servic 1580, First Report and Order, 62 Fed. Reg. 32862 para. 46-
48, 286-90, 311-13 (1997)). See also Alenco Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 622 (5th
Cir. 2000) ("[P]ortability is not only consistent with predictability, but also is dictated by
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eligible to receive universal-service funding. However, long-standing
federal policy and recent FCC regulatory actions have consistently favored
landline over wireless technology in a manner that artificially
disadvantages wireless technology and hampers the achievement of both
the stated goals of universal service legislation and the more general goal
of greater connectivity of people to telecommunications networks.
In Section II, we discuss the history and the logistics of federal
support for universal service as well as portions of four important recent
regulatory documents that impact the distribution of the Universal Service
Fund to wireline versus wireless technology. In Section III, we examine
whether market intervention promoting universal service is economically
rational. This Section describes network effects and considers whether they
are likely sufficient to provide an economic rationale for market
intervention. Section IV discusses those historical and public-policy factors
that we believe have favored landline over mobile technologies,
particularly in areas served by small wireline incumbent local exchange
carriers (ILECs). Section V considers the implications of the FCC
eliminating the so-called equal-support rule (the rule in which qualified
providers in the same area receive the same funding regardless of
technology and costs).' 7 Section VI summarizes our findings and
conclusions.
II. THE HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE REGULATION
The notion of universal service was arguably first advanced by
Theodore Vail in a 1907 speech, in which he envisioned "one system, one
policy, universal service. 18 However, Vail's call for universal service
stated a commercial goal (the one system would be owned by AT&T),
rather than a desire for new government policy. After Alexander Graham
Bell's patent on the telephone device itself lapsed in 1894, AT&T faced a
massive proliferation of competition from new local exchange telephone
companies.' 9 Many of these companies sought to exploit AT&T's focus on
providing telephone service to business customers in major cities by
principles of competitive neutrality and the statutory command that universal service
support be spent 'only for the provision, maintenance, and upgrading of facilities and
services for which the [universal service] support is intended."') (citation omitted).
17. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 Fed.
Reg. 11580 para. 1 (2008).
18. Krishna P. Jayakar & Harmeet Sawhney, Universal service: beyond established
practice to possibility space, 28 TELECOMM. POL'Y 339, 339 (2004). See also STUART
MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN & HowARD A. SHELANSKI,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 614-20 (1st ed. 2001); Gerald W. Brock, Historical
Overview, in 1 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS EcoNoMIcs, 44-74, at 50-52 (Martin
E. Cave et al. eds., 2002).
19. Jayakar & Sawhney, supra note 18, at 342.
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providing service to residential customers in smaller cities and rural
towns.2° Vail and AT&T generally refused to permit interconnection
between its network and the new, local exchange companies where the new
companies' facilities geographically overlapped with those of AT&T;2' the
result was a morass of different, incompatible telephone company networks
in which a customer on one provider's network could not necessarily call a
customer on another network.22 As such, Vail's call for universal service
can more properly be seen as advocating a single telephone network
(AT&T's), rather than an expansion of connectivity to more people.23
The federal government's first implicit universal-service policy came
in the form of favorable federal legislation and regulatory action as AT&T
persued its vision of universal service in the form of monopoly.24 Insofar as
AT&T sought government action promoting its vision of universal service,
it was in the form of government permission (or lack of proscription) for
AT&T's continued acquisition of rival telephone companies in
contravention of antitrust laws.25 While the federal government was
initially indifferent to AT&T's efforts, AT&T's continued campaign of
acquisition eventually attracted the attention of the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division. 6 In response, AT&T and the Attorney General agreed
on several limitations to AT&T's business activity, formally known as the
Kingsbury Commitment.27 The Kingsbury Commitment was ostensibly a
victory for the government, as AT&T agreed to divest itself of Western
Union, provide long-distance services to independent exchanges under
certain conditions, and refrain from acquisitions of independent telephone
companies if the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) objected.28
20. See Henk Brands & Evan T. Leo, The Law and Regulation of Telecommunications
Carriers 2-3 (1998).
21. However, when AT&T did not serve significant areas served by the other telephone
company, AT&T was aggressive in pursuing interconnection arrangements. See, e.g., id. at
3.
22. Id. at 3-4. See also Brock, supra note 18, at 48-49; Gerald Brock,
TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE: FROM MONOPOLY TO
COMPETITION 65 (1994).
23. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 20, at 3. See also Milton Mueller, Myth Made Law:
Universal Service and the Telecommunications Act, Comm. of the ACM, Mar. 1997, at 39,
40-41.
24. Mueller, supra note 23, at 40-41.
25. See id.
26. See Adam D. Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development
of the Bell Telephone Monopoly, 14 CATO J. 267, 272 (1994), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjv 14n2-6.html.
27. Glen 0. Robinson, Title I-The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins
and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
3, 7-8 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). See also BRANDS & LEO, supra note 20, at 48-55.
28. Robinson, supra note 27, at 8.
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However, the agreement actually favored the continued expansion of
AT&T and consolidation in some markets; not only did it stave off the
federal takeover of AT&T that many expected, but it also permitted AT&T
to continue to acquire other telephone companies so long as it sold off an
equal number of companies to independent buyers.29 Independent
telephone companies were able to maintain significant market share until
1921, when Congress passed the Willis-Graham Act,30 which exempted
telephone companies from stringent antitrust oversight and gave official
sanction to AT&T's goal of universal service via monopoly.3' As Lloyd
noted, "[b]y 1924, the ICC had approved AT&T's acquisition of 223 of the
234 independent telephone companies. 32
The year 1934 was a watershed year in the industry because of the
passage of the Communications Act of 1934 and the creation of the FCC to
regulate interstate telephone service. Although AT&T continued to act as a
regulated, vertically integrated entity until 1984, 33 the Communications Act
created the FCC
[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.
34
This portion of the Communications Act was "a list of all the good
things that come about from telecommunications"; the Act itself did not
contain any substantive legislation promoting the goal of universal
service.35 Indeed, one author notes that "'[u]niversal service,' in either its
modem or classical sense, did not appear in the deliberations [in passing
the 1934 Act]. Congressional records contain no mention of telephone
penetration levels. 36 The Act did, however, create a more explicit
29. BRANDS & LEO, supra note 20 at 4. This arrangement fostered "monopoly-
swapping" instead of competition, as it allowed AT&T to acquire and maintain geographic
monopolies by exchanging ownership of telephone systems with independent companies.
Thierer, supra note 26, at 272 (citing GERALD BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 156 (1981)).
30. Willis-Graham Act, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
221(a)), repealed by Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 601(b)(2) Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 143 (codified at scattered sections of title 47 of the U.S. Code) (1996).
31. See Mark Lloyd, AT&T and Whatever Happened to Antitrust?, CENTER FOR AM
PROGRESS, Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/04/b1530843.html
(last visited Dec. 10., 2009).
32. Id.
33. A Brief History: The Bell System, AT&T, http://www.corp.att.com/history/history
3.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
35. MUELLER, supra note 6, at 156-58. The legislative history of the Act does not
address § 151. Id. at 157.
36. Id.
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regulatory mechanism, and the potential for development of a federal
universal service policy.
3 7
After the expiration of AT&T's original patent on the telephone
device expired in 1893, AT&T's patents on long-distance switching
machines (and cross-licensing agreements) made the distinction between
local telephone service and long-distance telephone service important.
38
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.
39
established an important legal precedent for federal influence over the
method of recovery of a portion of the so-called nontraffic-sensitive costs
of local exchange telephone companies.40 In order to complete a long-
distance call, AT&T must utilize the local telephone companies' facilities
to originate the call (which would then be carried on AT&T's facilities) as
well as terminate the call. The Court held that, even though only
approximately one-half of one percent of the calls at the time were
interstate long-distance calls,41 the actual use of the local exchange
facilities to originate and terminate long-distance calls meant that interstate
long-distance service must contribute to the recovery of the costs of the
local exchange.42
In 1934, only two percent of all telephone calls were interstate4 3 and,
thus, within the jurisdiction of the FCC,44 leaving most control of telephone
service with state regulators. Between 1934 and 1996, no federal universal-
service legislation was passed.45 Rather, in the years after the passage of the
1934 Communications Act, a universal-service concept was slowly
37. Cybertelecom: Universal Service, http://www.cybertelecom.org/usf/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 10, 2009).
38. See Gerald W. Brock, The Regulatory Change in Telecommunications: The
Dissolution of AT&T, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 210, 218
(Leonard W. Weiss & Michael W. Klass eds., 1986); Brock, supra note 18, at 48.
39. 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 147. This was the value in 1922, when the data provided by AT&T was
originally developed for the calculations used in the case. See id. at 144-45.
42. Id. at 150-51:
[I]t is quite another matter to ignore altogether the actual uses to which the
property is put. It is obvious that, unless an apportionment is made, the intrastate
service to which the exchange property is allocated will bear an undue burden--to
what extent is a matter of controversy. We think that this subject requires further
consideration, to the end that by some practical method the different use of the
property may be recognized and the return properly attributable to the intrastate
service may be ascertained accordingly.") (internal citations omitted).
Id; see also BRANDS & LEO, supra note 20, at 48-55.
43. Pat Norton, Newcomers and Innovation in the US. TelephoneIndustry, in The
Emergence of the Knowledge Economy: A Regional Perspective 215, 224 (Zolthn J. Acs,
Henri L. F. de Groot & Peter Nijkamp, eds., 2002).
44. BRANDS & LEO, supra note 20, at 6.
45. Cybertelecom: Universal Service, supra note 37.
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developed and advanced largely through cross-subsidization of local
46
service by AT&T's long-distance service. This concept arose from a
complex give-and-take between state regulators, who wished to keep local
telephone service inexpensive, and the FCC and AT&T, which wanted to
lower the cost of long-distance interstate telephone service.47 Specifically,
state regulators sought to subsidize the cost of providing local telephone
service by transferring revenues from AT&T's long-lines division (which
was then virtually the only long-distance service provider) back to local
exchange companies. This occurred via a complex web of revenues
"settlements" processes, where revenues were distributed back to local
exchange companies as well as allocations of a portion of the nontraffic-
sensitive costs of the local exchange to the interstate jurisdiction.48
Although this plan met with limited success in the 1940s and 1950S,49 cost-
lowering advances in long-distance telephone technology permitted
regulators during the 1960s and 1970s to shift greater costs to long-distance
carriers without forcing significant increases in long-distance prices.' °
46. For a survey of the literature on cross-subsidy in telecommunications, see Parsons,
supra note 8, at 158-161. See also, e.g., David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-
subsidies in Telecommunications: Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone
Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 131-36 (1994); BENJAMIN, ET AL., supra note 18, at 618-
20.
47. See Jayakar & Sawhney, supra note 18, at 343. The conflict between state and
federal authorities centered on the method of allocating the costs of running local
exchanges, and the telephone-cable and switch systems that connected incoming calls to
intended recipients for a given geographic area. See id. Both local and long-distance service
made use of local exchanges to connect callers to their intended recipients. See id. State
regulators advocated the use of a "station-to-station" method, which allocated a substantial
portion of the cost of the exchanges to long-distance carriers. Id. The FCC and AT&T, on
the other hand, advocated using a "board-to-board" method, which would pay for local
exchanges through fees charged to customers making use of the exchange within its
geographic area. Id.
48. See Smith v. 11. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (requiring state regulators to allocate
local access charges to telephone companies based on interstate versus intrastate use of the
exchange). Later, through complicated dealings and negotiations with the FCC and AT&T,
state regulators began to shift more of the costs of intrastate service to interstate service. See
CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING, PHYLLIS W. BERNT, & MARTIN B. H. WEISS, SHAPING AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 101-04
(2006).
49. In 1947, the FCC codified its rules for calculating the allocation of costs between
local and interstate jurisdictions in its Separations Manual. FCC, SEPARATIONS MANUAL
(1947) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 36). However, the Separations Manual did not permit
charging long-distance carriers in excess of a portion of local exchange costs commensurate
with the level of interstate long-distance usage until 1951. Id. Even by 1965, only three
percent of the costs of local exchanges were being covered by payments from interstate
carriers. MUELLER, supra note 6, at 160.
50. Jayakar & Sawhney, supra note 18, at 343. A number of other factors contributed to
the achievement of universal service goals under this regime, specifically by subsidizing the
cost of long-distance telephone service in rural, residential areas, which would not have
been cost-effective otherwise. AT&T calculated long-distance charges based on geographic
Number 1]
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Generally, on a per-call basis, long-distance calls provided an
increasingly higher level of recovery of the nontraffic-sensitive costs of the
local exchange vis-A-vis local calls.5' In 1970, the adoption of the so-called
Ozark Plan formalized the separation of costs to be allocated to the
interstate jurisdiction.5 2 In 1983, the allocation of nontraffic-sensitive loop
costs was frozen at twenty-five percent, even though interstate long-
distance usage was significantly less than twenty-five percent of the call
minutes at the time.53
When AT&T was virtually the only voice long-distance provider, it
was feasible for AT&T long-distance service to implicitly subsidize local
exchange service via the complex web of cost allocations and revenue
settlements. However, a string of regulatory and court decisions, most
importantly, In the Matter of Allocations of Frequencies in the Bands
Above 890 Megahertz (allowing private microwave facilities for point-to-
point dedicated circuits) 54 and the eventual acceptance of MCI's Section
214 service application and its provision of Execunet Service (effectively
cost averaging, which assessed charges to customers based on the distance of the call, and
not on the density of calls made on that route or on other factors which had much more
influence on the actual cost of connecting the call to AT&T. As such, customers on low-
density, high-cost lines (primarily those serving rural areas) were subsidized by higher
charges to long-distance customers on high-density lines. Additionally, AT&T imposed
higher charges on business customers (who were primarily grouped in urban areas), which
subsidized the cost of service to residential customers, including those in rural, high-cost
areas. The full details of cross-subsidization under AT&T's monopoly are extremely
complicated and exceed the scope of this Article. For more information, see CAROL
WEINHAUS ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES ANALYSIS PROJECT: WHAT IS THE
PRICE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE? IMPACT OF DEAVERAGING NATIONWIDE URBAN/RURAL RATES
(1993). See also Parsons, supra note 8.
51. The use of certain cost allocators, such as "subscriber plant factors" (SPF) rather
than "subscriber usage factors," (SLU) lead to higher allocations to interstate long-distance
calls. The SPF factor assigned approximately 3.3 percent of local company non-traffic
sensitive cost to the interstate jurisdiction for every 1% of interstate calling (SLU). See
Amendment of Part 67 of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board
(Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order Establishing a Joint Board), 78 F.C.C.2d 837,
841 (1980) (Section 23.44 of the Separations Manual). See also Parsons, supra note 8, at
165; and MCI v FCC, 750 F.2d 135, 242 U.S.App.D.C. 287.
52. See Mueller, supra note 6, at 160.
53. CAROL L. WEINHAUS & ANTHONY G. OETTINGER, BEHIND THE TELEPHONE DEBATES
103 (1998). See also Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Request for Interpretation of the Applicability
of the Limit on Change in Interstate Allocation, Section 36.154(f) of the Comm'ns Rules,
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 10835 para. 2 (1996); 47 C.F.R. § 36.126(d)(3) (2006).
54. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., Report and Order, 27
F.C.C. 359, 403-13 (1959), reconsideration denied, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960). See, e.g., PETER
TEMIN & LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND
POLITICS 30-31 (1987); BROCK, POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 22, at 105-
11. See also GERALD BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF
MARKET STRUCTURE 156, 177-207 (1981).
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allowing MCI to offer switched voice services),55 led to the unintentional
demise of the AT&T long-distance monopoly.56 These competitive inroads
into AT&T's long-distance monopoly led to contentious proceedings
attempting to formalize and replace the implicit cross-subsidies from long
distance when a new competitor (rather than AT&T) carried the call.57
Beginning in 1978, a line-based (rather than minute-based) Exchange
Network Facilities for Interstate Access (ENFIA) tariff was established in
an attempt to formalize the subsidies to local exchange carriers from new
long-distance competitors.58
After the divestiture of AT&T, however, the FCC established minute-
based switched access charges to replace the implicit subsidies provided by
AT&T long distance and the line-based ENFIA tariff charges paid by
AT&T's long-distance competitors. 59 These switched-access charges were
much higher than the Justice Department and AT&T's long-distance
competitors had expected.60 Interstate switched-access rates for large
carriers declined significantly over time, largely replaced by line-based
subscriber line charges (SLCs).6 '
55. See Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of App'n to Provide
Specialized Common Carrier Servs. in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave
Radio Serv. and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the Comm'ns Rules, First
Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, para. 159 (1971) (accepting MCI's application); MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978)
(allowing MCI to effectively offer switched voice services). See also BROCK, POLICY FOR
THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 22, at 111-46, 173-77; ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER
THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE COMPETITIVE ERA 20-22 (1991);
TEMIN & GALAMBOS, supra note 54, at 131-38.
56. See, e.g., BROCK, POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 22, at 102-121.
57. The loss of regulatory restrictions on entry into long distance in the aftermath of
Execunet, created a plethora of new long-distance operators competing with each other and
with AT&T. See Jayakar & Sawhney, supra note 18, at 344. The increase in competition
made switched access rates (the rates charged by local companies to originate and terminate
long-distance calls on the local network) a highly contentious issue between local and long
distance carriers. See id.
58. See, e.g., BROCK, POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 22, at 139-45.
59. See id.
60. AT&T's long-distance competitors had expected switched-access charges that
would be significantly below the ENFIA tariff rates, whereas in fact, switched access
charges were significantly greater than ENFIA. See id.
ance competitors had expected switched-access charges that would be significantly below
the ENFIA tariff rates, whereas in fact, switched access charges were significantly greater
than ENFIA. See id.
61. See, e.g., Report, FCC, Trends in Telephone Service, 1-4 tbl. 1.2 (2005), available
at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/lAD/trend
605.pdf. This requires some institutional knowledge to interpret. Footnote 1 of the table
states "This table shows average rates (weighted by minutes of use) for all local exchange
carriers (LECs) that file access tariffs subject to price-cap regulation and all LECs in the
National Exchange Carrier Association (NECA) pool." There are two effects here: (1) price
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The concept of universal service was finally codified by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.62 The Act's universal service section
stated six specific goals: (1) the provision of communications service "at
just, reasonable, and affordable rates"; 63 (2) access to advanced
telecommunications and information services in all regions of the country;
(3) access in rural and high-cost areas of the country; (4) equitable and
nondiscriminatory contributions from all providers of telecommunications
services toward the provision of universal service; (5) specific, predictable,
and sufficient federal and state mechanisms to preserve and advance
universal service; and (6) access to advanced telecommunications services
for schools, healthcare providers, and libraries. 64 Development of specific
regulatory provisions is delegated to a Federal-State Joint Board composed
of FCC and state public utility commission personnel.65 The distributions
of funds collected is administered by the Universal Service Administrative
Corporation, and funds are distributed via four programs: (1) "High Cost"
funding to provide telephone service at reasonable cost to areas of the
country where the provision of service is significantly more expensive, (2)
"Low Income" funding to provide basic local telephone service to low-
income customers, (3) "Rural Health Care" funding to provide video-
conferencing technology and high-speed Internet access for rural hospital
patients to use in obtaining access to distant medical specialists, and (4) "E-
Rate" funding to provide Internet access and telecommunications services
for schools and libraries.66
Previous cross-subsidization was to be made explicit as a universal-
service subsidy in the requirement that "[e]very telecommunications carrier
that provides interstate telecommunications services shall contribute, on an
equitable and non-discriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and
sufficient mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and
advance universal service., 67 And "[a]ny such support should be explicit
and sufficient to achieve the purposes of this section., 68 This stood "in
sharp contrast to the tradition of implicit telecommunication cross-
subsidies in the US, and much of the rest of the world.... However, the
cap companies are virtually all larger companies; and (2) the very phenomenon of weighting
by minutes causes large-company values to dominate.
62. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at scattered sections of title 47 of
the U.S. Code).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2006).
64. Id. § 254(b)(1)-(6).
65. Id. § 254(a)(1).
66. See Universal Service Administrative Compan: Universal Service Fund,
http://www.usac.org/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
67. Id. § 254(d).
68. Id. § 254(e).
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FCC has made slow and limited progress in meeting the
Telecommunications Act's objective of making universal service support
explicit." 69 The persistence of implicit cross-subsidies and historical bias in
favor of landline communications influences the role mobile
communications plays in universal service.
III. RECENT FEDERAL ACTIONS IMPORTANT TO MOBILE AND
THE USF
Within the last two years, there has been a growing focus on
universal-service policy and support mechanisms in the United States. This
comes at a time when mobile technologies are critically important to
consumers and to the connectivity of the nation. Four recent regulatory
actions are important to federal universal service, particularly as they relate
to mobile communications.
A. The Joint Board Recommendation
On November 20, 2007, the FCC released the recommended decision
of the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service.7° One of the most
important dimensions of the recommendation was "that the nation's
communications goals include achieving universal availability of mobility
services (defined as wireless voice), universal availability of broadband
Internet services, and voice services at affordable and comparable rates for
all rural and non-rural areas."71
The Joint Board also recommended that (1) three separate funds be
established (for landline voice, mobile voice, and broadband Internet
access); 72 (2) funding be capped at current levels;73 (3) the process should
avoid funding competition or building duplicate networks; 74 (4) the
"identical support" for wireless carriers at levels for landline carriers be
eliminated;75 and (5) reverse auctions may offer advantages over current
universal service funding distribution mechanisms.76
69. Steve G. Parsons, Laffont & Tirole's Competition in Telecommunications: A View
From the US, 9 INT'L J. ECON. Bus. 419, 432-33 (2002).
70. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Recommended Decision, 23 F.C.C.R. 1539,
para. 1 (2007).
71. Id. at para. 4.
72. See id. at paras. 1, 4.
73. Id. at para. 2.
74. Id. at para. 3.
75. See id. at para. 5.
76. Id. at para. 6.
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B. The January 29, 2008, FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM)
On January 29, 2008, the FCC released its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, providing tentative conclusions and seeking comment on
issues, such as whether the identical-support rule should be eliminated, the
methods by which the costs of competitive eligible telecommunications
carriers (CETCs) might be calculated, and whether the funding to CETCs
should be capped.77 The FCC did later vote to temporarily cap the
Universal Service Fund (USF) for CETCs.7 S
The NPRM itself was noticeably silent on whether three separate
funds should be established, the process should avoid funding competition
or duplicate facilities, or reverse auctions should be employed.79
C. The FCC Order for an Interim Cap for CETCs
In May 2007, the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service
recommended an interim cap on USF payments to CETCs.8° In keeping
with this recommendation, the FCC ordered that "total annual competitive
ETC support for each state will be capped at the level of support that
competitive ETCs in that state were eligible to receive during March 2008
on an annualized basis.,, 8' The FCC provided two exemptions to the cap for
CETCs "to the extent it files cost data demonstrating that its costs meet the
support threshold in the same manner as the incumbent local exchange
carrier (LEC)," and "competitive ETCs serving tribal lands or Alaska
Native regions. 82
77. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note
16, at para. 1.
78. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 8834, para. 5 (2008). See,
e.g., John Dunbar & Dibya Sarkar, Federal Regulators Cap Cell Phone Company Payments,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/
business/taxes/articles/2008/05/01/federal regulators cap cell_phone companypayments/.
79. The statement of Chairman Martin reflects his continued belief in the long-term
viability of reverse auctions. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 1531, 1579 (2008). Peculiarly, the statement of Commissioner
Copps includes the following: "I must dissent from the NPRM's tentative conclusion that
the Commission should develop an auction mechanism to determine high-cost support." Id.
at 1581. And the statement by Commissioner Adelstein includes the following: "To that
end, I am also concerned about the impact of reverse auctions and whether such
mechanisms can provide adequate incentives for build out in Rural America." Id. at 1583.
These statements must be based on their reading of a draft of the NPRM rather than the final
NPRM itself.
80. See High-Cost Universal Service Support, Recommended Decision, 22 F.C.C.R.
8998, para. 5 (2007).
81. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Order, supra note 78, at para. 1.
82. Id.
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D. The November 5, 2008, FCC Order on Remand, Report and
Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM)
On November 5, 2008, the FCC released an order on remand, a report
and order, and a further notice of proposed rulemaking.83 Although the
order largely deals with ISP-bound traffic, the FCC noted the following:
"[w]e thank the Joint Board and its staff for their hard work in studying
these difficult issues and in developing their recommendations. We choose
not to implement these recommendations at this time, however." 84 The
FCC did seek comments on three proposals,85 most notably the Chairman's
Proposal86 which would, with respect to universal service, (1) establish a
commitment to offer broadband services as a precondition to receiving
high-cost, universal-service funding; 87 (2) establish reverse auctions to
determine funding amounts for areas unserved by broadband;8 8 (3)
establish a pilot program for broadband service for Lifeline and Link Up
(low-income customers); 89 and (4) collect funds via a telephone numbers-
based method.90
IV. Is MARKET INTERVENTION FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE
ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL?
At this point, we step back from the history and specific mechanisms
designed to achieve universal service to consider the underlying economic
rationale for intervening in markets. Given the magnitude of the interstate
USF and the 11.4 percent tax on interstate telecommunications end-user
services, there should be a strong economic rationale for intervention in the
telecommunications market to achieve the universal-service outcome.
A. The Test for Market Intervention
The value of relying on competitive markets (or, effectively,
competitive markets as a practical matter) is well known in economics. 91
Governments should only interfere in the workings of markets when (1) the
freely functioning market has failed to produce the results that would be
superior for society (i.e., that market results would be welfare inferior to
83. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Order on Remand and Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 6475 (2008).
84. Id. at para. 37.
85. Id. at para. 40.
86. Id. at app. A.
87. Id. atapp. Aatpara. 20.
88. Id. atapp. Aatpara. 33.
89. Id. at app. A at para. 64.
90. Id. at app. A at para. 92.
91. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications (1996, 9th
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intervention) and (2) the benefits of market intervention are greater than the
costs of intervention (i.e., the evaluation of the potential superiority of
intervention reflect both the direct costs of regulation/intervention and the
indirect costs of any market distortions resulting from
regulation/intervention).92 This test is germane for both antitrust remedies
as well as the more encompassing regulation of a market.
B. Network Effects, a Rationale for Market Intervention?
For telecommunications and for universal service in
telecommunications in particular, what market characteristics may provide
a rationale for government intervention? It is well known in
telecommunications economics and the economics of networks, that the
demand for telecommunications services is different from the demand for
traditional products and services, like groceries, automobiles, or dry
cleaning.93 A telecommunications customer's demand will depend, in part,
on factors that are external to the customer's decision to purchase.94
Generally, there are two types of telecommunications positive externalities
(also called, or closely related to, direct network effects or bandwagon
effects).95 These externalities are (1) network externalities where the value
of network subscription increases with the number of subscribers on a
network or a set of interconnected networks and (2) call or use
92. See, e.g., CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (2nd ed. 1988); R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 34 (1960) ("The Pigovian analysis shows us that it is possible to conceive of
better worlds than the one in which we live. But the problem is to devise practical
arrangements which will correct defects in one part of the system without causing more
serious harm in other parts.").
93. See HAL R. VARIAN, JOSEPH FARRELL & CARL SHAPIRO, THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION (2004); see also Stanley J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects, in I Handbook of Telecommunications Economics,
75 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002).
94. "In economics, an externality is an impact on any party not directly involved in an
economic decision. An externality occurs when an economic activity causes external costs
or external benefits to third party stakeholders who cannot directly affect an economic
transaction." ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND INSURANCE 22 (2003). POLLUTION is an example of a negative
externality; the polluter causes costs for others, and without government intervention, these
costs are not considered by the polluter (i.e., not included in the polluters decision process).
Dr. Paul Johnson, A Glossary of Political Economic Terms - Externality,
http://www.auburn.edu/-johnspm/gloss/extemality (last visited Dec, 10, 2009). In
telecommunications, positive externalities (often referred to as network effects) are
important.
95. See generally Liebowitz & Margolis supra note 93; Jeffirey H. Rohlfs, Bandwagon
Effects in Telecommunications, in 2 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 81
(Sumit K. Majumdar et al. eds., 2005); JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (2001); VARIAN, FARRELL & SHAPIRO, supra note 93. See also
BRANDS & LEO, supra note 20, at 19.
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externalities, which recognize that, for most calls, one party obtains value
from the call but generally does not pay for the call.96 It is also useful to
recognize that the value of subscription is derived from the value customers
expect to obtain from the calls they will make.
97
A direct network effect (or network externality) occurs when one
customer's subscription to the network leads to value obtained from other
subscribers on the network.98 Examples of direct network effects include
voice telephony, fax machines, and e-mail accounts. Indeed, direct network
effects create a strong incentive for network providers to be interconnected
(since network effects span individual providers) and a potential rationale
for government intervention to ensure interconnection on reasonable terms
between network providers. The existence of a direct network effect will
likely cause a critical mass of customers, beyond which the market will be
sufficient and self-sustainable. 99
96. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a
Communications Service, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 16 (1974); Ingo Vogelsang &
Bridger M. Mitchell, Telecommunications Competition: The Last Ten Miles 51 (1997);
Harald Gruber, The Economics of Mobile Telecommunications 191 (2005); Lester D.
Taylor, Telecommunications Demand in Theory and Practice 9 (1994) ("This is the first of
two demand externalities associated with the telephone, and is usually referred to as the call
(or use) externality."); John T. Wenders, The Economics of Telecommunications: Theory
and Policy 29 (Ballinger 1987) ("Finally, back to telephones. There are two possible sources
of externalities here-call externalities or network externalities. Call externalities may result
from the fact that both parties [of the call] may benefit from the placement of a phone call
even though the cost usually falls entirely on the caller. One of the ways in which call
externalities are revealed is by the value placed on telephone access [subscribership] for the
purpose of receiving incoming calls.").
97. See, e.g., Lyn Squire, Some Aspects of Optimal Pricing for Telecommunications, 4
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 515 (1973); WENDERS, supra note 96, at 29, 46-53; TAYLOR,
supra note 96, at 28-31, 83.
98. An indirect network effect is one in which two or more products in a "system" are
strong complements. Consider the example of DVD players and DVDs; customers do not
directly obtain value from others owning a DVD player, but rather benefit indirectly from
the greater choice of DVDs that exist with a large number of customers owning DVD
players. See, e.g., ROHLFS, supra note 95; VARIAN, FARRELL & SHAPIRO supra note 93. The
text by Varian, et al, provides a very intuitive, nontechnical treatment of the topic of direct
and indirect network effects.
99. See, e.g., VARIAN, FARRELL & SHAPIRO, supra note 93 at 34-35, fig. 3. The graph,
infra, is a slight modification to the one at page 35. Id at 35.
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Demand and Supply for a Network Good
Demand
WVillingness
to pay
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However, if the market fails to reach critical mass, significant
potential welfare gains (potential consumer surplus plus potential producer
rents) will not be obtained. This risk of failure is a strong potential rationale
for government intervention. But those who understand direct network
effects and the U.S. voice telecommunications market know that critical
mass has long been surpassed. 100 Therefore, the potential failure to reach
critical mass is not a viable rationale for universal service policies for voice
communications in the United States.
Direct network effects can still provide a weaker rationale for a
universal-service policy because the marginal network subscriber may
receive value of subscription below the price/cost of subscription, but the
benefit to others on the network of adding the marginal subscriber creates a
total societal value that is greater than the price/cost of subscription. To the
extent that the marginal cost of adding subscribers is below the marginal
subscription price, this rationale becomes stronger for government
intervention. 10 1
100. Indeed, Jeffrey Rohilfs has argued that AT&T originally employed a very poor
market strategy that was largely counter to the concept of direct network effects and critical
mass. RoHLFS, supra note 95, at 76-79. However, despite its ineptitude in this regard, AT&T
still managed to achieve critical mass.
101. The relevant comparison would be the marginal cost of adding a subscriber vis--
vis the Y value of subscription to adding the last subscriber (across all subscribers n). Note
that a monopolist provider would likely attempt to internalize this effect, but competing
providers would only attempt to internalize the effect to the extent that the value is received
by other subscribers on their own (but not other) networks.
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Direct network effects are also important to large network providers
as they attempt to internalize their own customers' externalities in
pricing. 10 2 This could come in the form of low or negative margins on
subscription prices and handsets (for mobile providers) and higher margins
for vertical features and usage. This could also take the form of price
discrimination to attract low-demand-elasticity subscribers. To the extent
that a provider attracts a community of interest (a group that tends to call
each other), the incentive for the provider to internalize the network
externality is stronger.
As total network penetration reaches very high levels, the network
externality (the value to existing subscribers) of adding an additional
subscriber tends to be relatively low. Telephone penetration in the United
States peaked in 2003, at approximately ninety-six percent. 10 3 Given that a
relatively small proportion of households have no telephone service, there
may be greater value in encouraging additional mobile subscription to
allow individuals to connect for a higher proportion of time and across a
greater geographic space. However, even mobile subscription in the United
States is relatively high, at eighty-seven percent. 104
Unfortunately, there is not a well-developed literature measuring the
network externality. A landline study from the early 1980s found that the
external benefit from adding a marginal subscriber was only about $4 per
month.' 05 Moreover, the current literature suggests that the cost of adding a
marginal customer to the network by simply keeping subscription prices
low to all customers is exceptionally high. One study found that the cost is
more than $20,000 to add a marginal customer with generically low prices
for all subscribers. 10 6 In contrast, means-based mechanisms (like the
Lifeline and Link Up programs at the federal level) are much more
effective. 10 7  In economic parlance, these programs utilize price
102. The externality is external to the individual customer decision-making process
regarding subscription, not necessarily external to the network provider's decision making.
103. FCC, Telephone Penetration by Income by State: Data Through March 2007, tbl. 4
(March 2008).
104. CTIA-The Wireless Association, Wireless Quick Facts,
http://www.ctia.org/content/index.cfin/AID/10323 (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
105. Given the vintage of this study, a current study would reflect an inflation
adjustment, causing the value to be higher, but would also reflect a lower value due to
higher penetration rates. JOHN T. WENDERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
THEORY AND POLICY 65 (Ballinger 1987), (citing Lewis Perl, "Residential Demand for
Telephone Service") (on file with the author).
106. Christopher Garbacz & Herbert G. Thompson, Jr., Estimating Telephone Demand
with State Decennial Census Data from 1970-1990: Update with 2000 Data, 24 J. REG.
ECON. 373, 377 (2003) ("The subsidy per year per added household would be about $20,570
(1999 dollars) [with an untargeted 10% reduction in monthly price].")
107. "Means-based" generally refers to support mechanisms restricted to--or targeted
to-lower-income individuals.
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discrimination to attract the customer segment that is likely to be much
more price sensitive and would otherwise be less likely to have subscribed
without assistance.'
1 08
C. Nonmeans-Based Mechanisms for Voice Communications Fail
the Test
Telecommunications/network economics, under the right
circumstances, provides a theoretical rationale for market intervention to
promote universal service-to induce additional subscribers to join the
network. However, given the maturity of the U.S. telecommunications
network (and the fact that the network has long ago surpassed the required
critical mass) and the small proportion of customers without service, the
potential justification is weak. This is especially true in light of the
empirical literature suggesting that the cost of adding subscribers via
nonmeans-based, universal-service mechanisms is far higher than the
benefits of adding those subscribers.'0 9 Therefore, nonmeans-based,
universal-service mechanisms for voice communication in the United
States fail the test for justifying market intervention (i.e., the evidence
suggests that the costs are far higher than the benefits).
As for potential subsidies for broadband subscription, our research is
not sufficient to provide a conclusion, but we raise five points to consider.
First, the Internet and independent broadband technologies have also
obviously passed critical mass. Second, by all measures, broadband
subscription is currently much lower than telephone subscription, meaning
that there likely is greater potential for higher marginal value by adding
subscribers vis-A-vis voice telephony. ° Third, the most obvious direct
network effect is e-mail use, but most e-mail sent has relatively low
bandwidth requirements. Fourth, since the demand for any network
subscription is derived from the value of usage, higher bandwidth usage
certainly could contribute to higher values of subscription and perhaps to
some other form of a network effect, such as subscriptions in order to share
large files. Fifth, there may be an economic-development rationale for
subsidies given the lower rates of penetration of broadband (vis-A-vis voice
108. See, e.g., Garbacz & Thompson, supra note 106; FCC, TELEPHONE PENETRATION BY
INCOME BY STATE, supra note 103, at 5 ("On average, for low-income households in those
states where full or high assistance is provided, telephone penetration increased by 3.2%,
between March 1997 and March 2007.").
109. See also, Fcc, Bringing Broadband to Rural America: Report on Rural Broadband
Strategy Fn. 285 (2009); and Robert Crandall and Leonard Waverman, Who Pays for
Universal Service: When Telephone Subsidies Become Transparent (2000). "Based on these
results, one might make a mild case for subsidizing one-time connection charges, but the
case for widespread suppression of all continuing monthly residential rates through internal
cross subsidies is surely much weaker." Id. at 90.
110. Compare FCC, TRENDs IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, Thl. 2.5 with Tbl. 7-3 (2008).
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telephony), especially in rural areas-that is, the existence of broadband
may attract higher-valued businesses (including those relying more on
small office/home office (SOHO) arrangements)."' This may be important
for local jurisdictions competing for residents and businesses.112 For
example, a June 2007 study found that, "for every one percentage point
increase in broadband penetration in a state, employment is projected to
increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percent per year."' 13 As of December 2006, the
International Telecommunications Union lists the United States as ranking
only twenty-fourth in broadband penetration in the world. 14 There are also
likely savings in fuel, opportunity cost of travel time, and pollution
reductions from expanded broadband connectivity.
D. A Rationale for Rural Subsidization?
Network effects provide the primary potential economic rationale for
subsidization of network subscription. Nonmeans-based subsidization of
voice communications, however, apparently fails the benefit/cost test for
government intervention. Is there an alternate rationale to provide subsidies
to rural voice telecommunications or broadband services?
If there is a significant difference in the demand elasticity for the
group of potential rural subscribers, this could provide some basis for an
economic rationale for rural subsidies." 5 Targeted means-based voice
telecommunications subsidies are relatively more effective than nonmeans-
111. See, e.g., Center to Bridge the Digital Divide: Rural Bridges Projects, Washington
State University, http://cbdd.wsu.edu/projects/rural/ruralbridges/projects.html#eda (last
visited Dec. 10, 2009); NoaNet Infrastructure, http://www.noanet.net/infiastructure/ (last
visited Dec. 10, 2009).
112. Much of the potential gains to one community are likely losses to another
community. As jurisdictions compete for such residents, these transfers should be irrelevant
to national policy.
113. Robert Crandall, William Lehr & Robert Litan, The Effects of Broadband
Deployment on Output and Employment. A Cross-sectional Analysis of U.S. Data, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (July 2007), available at http://www3.brookings.edu/
views/papers/crandall/2007061itan.pdf.
114. Economies by Broadband Penetration, 2007 International Telecommunications
Union, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/atglance/top20_broad_2006.html (last visited
Dec. 10, 2009).
115. We use the term "elasticity of demand" to refer to the price responsiveness of the
group. For any individual consumer, network subscription can be considered a binary
choice: they either subscribe to the network or they do not. One can model the choice by any
member of the group as a probability of subscription (dependent on, for example,
demographic characteristics such as income). However, as a group, one may still discuss
demand elasticity. For a group, the higher the own-price elasticity of demand for network
subscription, the more likely any form of a subsidy that has the effect of reducing the price
paid by consumers of that group will lead to the addition of a network subscriber-to induce
someone within that group to subscribe to voice telecommunications service who would
otherwise not have subscribed.
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
based subsidies because they represent a form of price discrimination,
focusing on a relatively price-sensitive group (low-income consumers). It is
indeed logical to expect that, as a group, low-income consumers are more
price sensitive for virtually any good or service, including subscription to a
communications network. However, we are not aware of research that
suggests that rural America has significantly higher own-price elasticity of
demand for voice or broadband subscription.
Even so, the prices of some goods and services do vary across
urban/rural categories. Housing and land prices, for example, are obviously
much higher in urban areas." 6 Means-based subsidies for housing do exist,
but we are not aware of any nonmeans-based subsidies. Like housing
subsidies, subsidies to rural telecommunications and broadband services
are likely to be more effective if they are means-based, if one believes that
additional subsidies are warranted beyond those existing for voice
telephony.
E. It Is Critical to Avoid Distorting the Competitive Process
For any government intervention in a market, it is important to avoid
unintended distortions in the competitive process, especially when, as here,
the rationale for market intervention is weak. It is absolutely critical for the
FCC and state commissions to avoid any measures that distort the
competitive process as it generates revenues for, and provides subsidies to,
telecommunications and broadband services.
The Rural Task Force noted nine years ago that "Section 254(b) and
214(e) of the 1996 Act provide the statutory framework for a system that
encourages competition while preserving and advancing universal
service.""' 7 The FCC recognized this statutory mandate in 1997, when it
stated that "[u]niversal service support mechanisms and rules should...
neither unfairly advantage nor disadvantage one provider over another, and
neither unfairly favor nor disfavor one technology or another."' 1 8 We
applaud the FCC for previously establishing competitive neutrality as a
principle of universal service,119 such that universal service neither
disadvantages one technology or service provider over another. Our
concern is that this principle has not been consistently applied.
116. See National Association of Realtors, Metropolitan Median Prices-3r d Quarter
2009, available at http://www.realtor.org/research/research/metroprice.
117. Rural Task Force, Competition and Universal Service 8 (The Rural Task Force of
the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, White Paper No. 5, 2000, available at,
http://www.wutc.wa.gov/rtf/old/RTFPubBackup20051020.nsf/43e458610b70dda8882567d
00074c6cd/6597dd7d0c39c96f88256977006190f7/$FILE/Wp5.pdf.
118. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
8776, para. 47 (1997).
119. Id. at paras. 46-48.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Alenco
Communications, Inc. v. FCC that the universal-service "program must
treat all market participants equally-for example, subsidies must be
portable-so that the market, and not local or federal government
regulators, determines who shall compete for and deliver services to
customers."'120 The Fifth Circuit noted that nondiscriminatory access to
high-cost support, by incumbent and competitor alike "is made necessary
not only by the economic realities of competitive markets but also by
statute' 2 ' and that "[t]he FCC must see to it that both universal service and
local competition are realized; one cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
other."'
122
V. U.S. HISTORY AND PAST POLICIES HAVE FAVORED
LANDLINE OVER MOBILE TECHNOLOGY
Because of the relatively weak economic rationales for nonmeans-
based support for voice communications universal service, it is critically
important that universal-service mechanisms not distort the competitive
process. One form of such market distortion can occur by favoring one type
of technology over another. We find that universal-service policy in the
United States has favored landline over mobile technologies; this is in
keeping with several characteristics of U.S. history and regulatory policy
that have favored landline technology over mobile technology.
A. Previously, Mobile Providers Could Not Obtain High-Cost
Funding
Prior to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, only incumbent
landline local exchange carriers could receive high-cost, universal-service
funding. While this asymmetry was, at least in theory, 123 eliminated by the
FCC's implementation of the Act, the historical bias clearly has effects
today. It is likely that there are some rural areas for which a wireless
technology would have been the least-cost technology. As such, rational
public policy would have been to have a wireless provider be the
incumbent provider in that jurisdiction. Landline providers obviously now
have the advantage of having received high-cost funding for some period of
time already.
120. Alenco Comm's, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2000).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 615.
123. We do not treat here the issue of the difficulty wireless providers may have in
obtaining CETC status in some jurisdictions.
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B. Wireless Providers Do Not Receive Landline Switched-Access
Charges
Originating and terminating switched-access charges are still, on
average, greater than the marginal cost of originating and terminating calls.
Indeed, the so-called common carrier line charge is by its name and nature
designed to recover a portion of the nontraffic-sensitive loop costs. While
federal switched access charges have declined over time for large carriers,
state-based rates are often still comparatively high, particularly for smaller
rural landline providers. For example, the table below shows the rates in
our former state of residence, Missouri.' 24 Note that, even counting the
large carriers like AT&T, thirty-six of the forty-three telephone companies
have average switched-access rates (across interLATA and intraLATA
rates) per conversation minute of $0.1388 or higher.125
124. Telecomm. Dep't, Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Switched Access Rate
Comparison of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (2009), available at
http://www'psc.mo.gov/telecommunications/industry-information/access.pdf.
125. Id.
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This represents an important source of revenue for rural ILECs, that is
virtually unavailable to wireless providers.
C. Wireless Carriers Make Significant Contributions to Spectrum
Auctions
Unlike wireline carriers, wireless carriers make significant
contributions to spectrum auctions such that the payments made via
competitive bidding reflect competition between wireless providers. Given
the sheer amount of payments collected from mobile-communications
providers from spectrum auctions, it is clear that there is a large premium
paid beyond the value in the next highest use (for uses other than mobile-
communications providers).126
As a result, any public policy that asymmetrically disadvantages
wireless providers vis-d-vis wireline carriers has the spillover effect of
reducing payments for spectrum and thereby reducing funding to the
federal government.
D. Wireless Services Are Taxed More Heavily Than Wireline
Services
Wireless services are also slightly disadvantaged by higher tax
burdens than those faced by wireline carriers.2 7 Not only is this another
source of competitive disadvantage for wireless providers, but it results in
marginally lower tax revenues from wireless carriers compared to what
would have occurred with symmetric treatment.
E. The U.S. Mobile-Party-Pays Regulatory Regime Disadvantages
U.S. Mobile Providers
For the vast majority of telecommunications calls around the world,
the principle of calling-party-pays is applied. 128 That is, the network of the
126. The auction in March 2008 alone netted over $19 billion. Molly Peterson, U.S.
Airwaves Bids Total $19.6 Billion; Auction Ends, (Mar. 18, 2008) http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aQ8aGoF3c4LY (last visited Dec. 10, 2009). This was
only one of a large number of spectrum auctions in which mobile operators made the great
majority of bids. See FCC Spectrum Action Data, Pennsylvania State University,
http://capcp.psu.edu/FCC/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
127. See, e.g., Scott Mackey, Excessive, Discriminatory Taxes on Wireless Hurt
Consumers, Business, and U.S. Economy, Info. Tech. & Telecomm. News (Apr. 2008),
available at http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/23012/ExcessiveDiscriminatory_
Taxes on WirelessHurtConsumersBusiness and US Economy.html.
128. S.C. Littlechild, Mobile Termination Charges: Calling Party Pays vs. Receiving
Party Pays, 30 TELECOM. POLICY 242, 244 (2006). See also, "Wholesale Termination
Regime, Termination Charge Levels and Mobile Industry Performance" (A study
undertaken for the British regulator OFCOM) at 9, available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/mobilecallterm/.
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calling party bills the customer that originates the call (whether as part of a
bundled offering or separately as an unbundled tariff charge), and that
network then becomes responsible for paying any fees to the network on
which the call is terminated.
129
The two major exceptions to this worldwide rule are (1) toll-free,
long-distance calling and (2) calls terminated on mobile telephones in the
United States, Canada, Singapore, and Hong Kong.130 In these countries,
the call-payment system goes by the misnomer "receiving-party-pays"
(RPP); in fact, it is not the receiving party that pays, but rather the mobile
party. In the rest of the world, when a landline customer originates a call to
a mobile customer, the originating landline customer pays for the call.
Perhaps more importantly, the charges paid to mobile-network providers
are typically much higher than those paid to landline networks. The
European Commissioner for Competition Policy stated that European
mobile call termination rates are ten times higher than those for fixed-line
providers. 13' This is due to the higher proportion of traffic-sensitive (versus
nontraffic-sensitive) costs for mobile as compared to landline
technologies.
132
The mobile-party-pays system thus creates a competitive
disadvantage for U.S. mobile providers; indeed, RPP has likely contributed
to many foreign countries having higher rates of mobile penetration than
exist in the United States. 133 Moreover, RPP is not technology neutral and
favors landline over wireless technology since landline customers obtain
value from originating calls to wireless customers. This distortion is
compounded by landline network switched-access revenues (for long-
distance calls), which are virtually unavailable to mobile providers.
F. Wireless Service Must Compete with Low Landline Subscription
Prices
Because of the factors listed above, wireless services must compete
with low landline monthly service rates, especially in rural areas. The
129. Littlechild, supra note 128, at 245.
130. Id. at246.
131. Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, European Union,
Cutting the Price of Phone Calls - New Termination Rules (May 7, 2009) available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/218&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
132. Landline technologies have generally displayed a higher proportion of nontraffic-
sensitive costs.
133. See Global Penetration Rates, RCR NEwS (Aug. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.rcmews.com/assets/pdf/CR1236727.pdf (showing the top twenty nations by
wireless penetration rate, of which the United States is not one); Posting of Tomi Ahonen to
Wireless Future, http://wirelessfuture.tribe.net/thread/2e3658c6-db4f-405e-806f-
6dcl2bb2e9f8 (Mar. 20, 2006, 9:43 EST).
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FCC's twelfth CMRS Report discusses such barriers to entry in the
provision of wireless services, 34 which are, arguably, the most severe when
competing against rural ILEC telephony.
This story of landline regulatory regimes disadvantaging wireless
providers is not completely unique to the United States; however, in
Canada (one of the only two other countries adopting RPP), one
commentator contends that "[o]ne of the causes of Canadians' slowness to
adopt cellular telephony is our regulatory policy: in particular, long-
standing cross-subsidies maintain artificially low wireline prices, reducing
cellular's relative competitiveness and incentives to invest in better quality,
expanded cellular coverage."
' 135
One may be tempted to point to the relatively rapid growth of mobile
communications in the United States or the decline in landline penetration
in recent years to suggest that mobile communications is not competitively
disadvantaged. However, rates of wireless growth in other countries are
generally greater than (and often much greater than) those in the United
States.136 One econometric study found that, given its income levels, U.S.
mobile penetration is significantly below what one would expect compared
to other countries.
137
134. See Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993: Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Twelfih Report, 23 F.C.C.R. 2241, paras. 70-102 (2008).
135. Neil Quigley & Margaret Sanderson, Going Mobile---Slowly: How Wireline
Telephone Regulation Slows Cellular Network Development at the Study in Brief (Dec.
2005) (emphasis added), available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_222.pdf.
136. See, e.g., Connect CIS 2009: Statistics and Figures, International
Telecommunications Union (2009), available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/connect/cis/figures.html. See also About Mobility, http://weblog.cenriqueortiz.com
/mobility/2008/12/29/worldwide-and-us-mobile-subscriber-penetration-dec-2008/ (Dec. 29,
2008, 11:38 CST).
137. Barbara Veronese & Martin Pesendorfer, Wholesale Termination Regime,
Termination Charge Levels and Mobile Industry Performance: A Study Undertaken for
Ofcom 12, 20, 24 (Apr. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/mobilecallterm/annex7.pdf. See id. at 12 (noting
that the noncalling party pays "B&K" data is all from the United States); id. at 20 ("Our
central finding is that take-up of mobile services is positively associated with both the level
of MTRs and the CPNP dummy."); id at 24 (showing that the calling-party-pays CPNP
binary variable is statistically significant with large coefficients at the one-percent level in
all four model specifications). Because the United States provides the only noncalling-party-
pays regime data, this statistical evaluation reflects U.S. regulatory policy in total with
respect to mobile communications, not just calling-party-pays.
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G. The FCC's May 2008 Order to Cap Payments to Competitive
but Not Incumbent ETCs Is Neither Symmetric Nor Competitively
Neutral
The FCC's order fails the test of competitive neutrality for at least
two reasons. First, while the order does allow for an exemption "to the
interim cap to the extent it files cost data demonstrating that its costs meet
the support threshold in the same manner as the incumbent local exchange
carrier (LEC), 1 38 there does not seem to be a mechanism that allows a
higher cost CETC to obtain higher funding-that is, the CETC's funding
will be less than the incumbent ETCs funding when its costs are lower, but
it will not be higher when its costs are higher.
Second, the cap appears to be asymmetrically binary. If the cost of the
competitive ETC is less than the incumbent ETC, then the funding drops to
a statewide adjusted reduction value. "For example, if, in State A, the
capped amount is $90 million, and the total uncapped support is $130
million, th. reduction factor would be 69.2 percent ($90/$130). In State A,
each competitive ETC's uncapped support would be multiplied by 69.2
percent to reduce support to the capped amount.' 39 However, if a specific
CETC in State A has costs of 95 percent of the incumbent ETC, it appears
that CETC would only receive 69.2 percent of the finding received by the
incumbent ETC.
H. The FCC's November 5, 2008, NPRMAppendices Are Neither
Symmetric Nor Competitively Neutral
The Chairman's proposal in Appendix A and the modified proposal in
Appendix C make receipt of universal-service funding contingent on a
commitment to provide broadband. 40 However, the timing of the loss of
funding is asymmetric: "[c]ompetitive ETCs that do not make this
commitment will not be eligible to receive high-cost support; incumbent
LECs that do not make this commitment will gradually lose their high-cost
support.' 14' All three appendices (A, B, and C) have another less obvious
form of asymmetry: they would administer reverse auctions at the
geographic level of the wireline incumbent's service territory. 42 While
138. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Order, supra note 78, para. 1.
139. Id. at para. 28.
140. High-Cost Universal Service Support, Order on Remand and Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 83, at app. A paras. 4, 19-31.
141. Id. at app. A para. 4 (emphasis added); but see id. at app. C para. 4.
142. Id. at app. A para. 35; id. at app. B para. 22; id. at app. C para. 35. This provides a
competitive advantage to the incumbent wireline provider since the geographic area for
which the bidding would occur precisely corresponds to their existing facilities. We do
recognize that such a geography may be the easiest to administer, but some recognition
should be made in the process of the technological (and company-specific) bias created.
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there is great potential to improve economic efficiency via the use of
reverse auctions for universal-service funding, particularly of the more
sweeping type provided for in Appendix B,143 the devil would be in the
details. 144
I. Implications for USF Policy
The FCC and state commissions should consider the existing
competitive distortions that already disadvantage wireless providers vis-A-
vis wireline providers in the United States. Any changes to the universal-
service program that further disadvantage wireless providers, given the
existing distortions, would be especially egregious.
VI. ELIMINATING THE IDENTICAL SUPPORT RULE?
Prior to the NPRM, the FCC had explicitly allowed CETCs to receive
universal-service funding after being certified by state public service
commissions as eligible. 145 CETCs could employ landline technologies (as
the incumbent ETCs do) or wireless technologies to connect customers. 146
Incumbent ETCs have long-standing requirements to file accounting cost
information that is used to determine the amount of universal-service
funding required. However, CETCs often have neither the same accounting
cost information available, nor do their service territories match those of
the incumbent landline ETC. In order to deal with these issues, the FCC
initially established the so-called identical-support rule, which provided
CETCs with universal-service funding identical in amount and in
geographic scope to that received by the incumbent.
47
The FCC's universal-service rules implicitly allowed support for
more than one "line" per household (via support to a wireless and a
landline provider); this was one of the factors that led to a growing fund
143. Appendix B appears to eliminate the old high-cost, universal-service funding
mechanism and replace it entirely with a reverse auction mechanism. Id. at app. B para. 20
(stating that "we conclude, instead, that support for competitive ETCs should be awarded in
the same manner as incumbent LEC ETC support, via reverse auction"). In contrast,
Appendices A and C state the following: "[flor these Unserved Study Areas, we will
conduct a reverse auction for the right to receive high-cost support." Id. at app. A para. 32;
see also id. app. C para. 32.
144. For instance, a winner-takes-all reverse auction has shortcomings since the winner
will not serve all (in contrast to competitive bids by suppliers, as the standard analogy). An
auction winner could end up serving only a small number of potential customers in an area
while others providing the same service would receive no universal-service subsidy
payment.
145. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, First Report and Order, supra note
16, at paras. 133-49.
146. Id. at para. 145.
147. Id. at paras. 286-90.
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size over time. 14 In response to that growth, the Joint Board proposed that
the identical-support rule be eliminated. 49 In doing so, the FCC has
employed reasoning inconsistent with sound economics and logic.
A. A Higher Proportion ofDisplacedLandlines Would Not Have
Reduced Universal Service Payments Under the Current System
The FCC suggests that much of its motivation to change the
universal-service support system is because "[t]hese wireless competitive
ETCs do not capture lines from the incumbent LEC to become a
customer's sole service provider, except in a small portion of
households."'' 50
The current system provides subsidy payments to the rural landline
incumbents, not on the basis of the number of landlines retained, but rather
on the basis of the total embedded costs of rural ILECs. If this were not the
case, payments to rural ILECs would have declined over time as their line
counts fell; instead, payments have remained relatively flat in recent years.
Indeed, the full displacement of rural ILEC landlines by growth in rural
wireless line counts would have led to two types of events. First, there may
have been small reductions in rural landline maintenance and operations
expenses vis-A-vis what would have happened with actual rural landline
counts. Second, line losses may have been great enough that loss of
revenues from services, including cross-elastic and so-called vertical
features would have eroded or eliminated rural landline profits. This would
have led to pressures for greater funding for universal service, increases in
service prices, and reduced regulation of rural landline service providers.
It is, therefore, inconsistent to imply that the need for reform is based
on the absence of rural landline displacement yet simultaneously claim that
growth in rural wireless has triggered the need for reform.
B. Unequal Subsidy Payments Are Antithetical to the Competitive
Process
To understand the consequences of eliminating the identical-support
rule, the FCC must consider how pricing occurs in unregulated markets. In
workably competitive markets, similar offerings tend to have similar
prices; otherwise, consumers will tend to choose the offering with the
lower price. As technology changes and as cost structures change, market
prices are likely to change over time as well. At any point in time, the price
in the market will tend to reflect the full costs (both marginal/volume
148. See High-Cost Universal Service Support, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra
note 16, at para. 2.
149. Id. at para. 5.
150. Id. at para. 9.
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sensitive costs and volume insensitive costs) of the least efficient provider
that is still in the market. Of course, there are likely firms that are
marginally excluded (those that have either left the market or did not yet
enter) with slightly higher costs than the least efficient provider. To the
extent that there are other, more efficient, providers in the market, they
receive the same price but earn rents or quasi-rents from their more
efficient operations. Over time, less efficient technologies tend to be
displaced as existing firms adopt the more efficient technology or as new
entrants utilize the more efficient technology.
When universal service is subsidized, the subsidy payment should
similarly represent that which would have occurred in a competitive
market. However, what does not occur in competitive markets (and thus,
should not be represented by subsidy payments) is that significantly
different levels of compensation are paid to firms that offer similar services
simply because the firms have different costs. 51 However, elimination of
the equal-support rule would have just such an effect-providing additional
compensation to some firms, but not to others.
C. Unequal Subsidy Payments Are Inconsistent with the FCC's
Rationale in Reflecting the Costs of the Most Efficient Provider
For universal-service subsidies, unbundled network elements, and
reciprocal compensation, the FCC dictated the use of cost calculations
reflective of the least-cost, most efficient providers for so-called nonrural
ILECs.152 Two different levels of USF support to carriers within the same
service area is clearly in conflict with the concept of least-cost, most
efficient providers, as some carriers would be receiving support beyond the
cost of the more efficient carrier. 
53
D. A Symmetrically Applied Individual Cap Would Be Rational and
Competitively Neutral
A symmetrically applied cap would provide sound signals to the
market participants. A mechanism-where costs are calculated for each of
the carriers in a service area and the support value is determined by the
lowest cost of the carriers-is competitively neutral, and would, in the long
run, send appropriate signals to market participants. In reaching such a
151. Indeed, this would imply unsustainably irrational consumer behavior.
152. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, para. 685 (1996).
153. Hold aside the fact that the method of calculation may be based on embedded costs
and therefore not reflective of forward-looking costs.
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goal, however, the FCC may wish to consider a transition path toward the
lower cost.1
54
E. The FCC Must Decide on the Application of a Symmetric Cap
Prior to Obtaining Cost Data
While a symmetric cap, applied to both wireline and wireless carriers,
could be competitively neutral, the choice must be made in the absence of
cost information based on the FCC's judgment regarding sound public
policy and not on the likely consequences for one technology over another.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over time, concepts of universal service have changed. The history of
wireline telecommunications originally led to notions of subscribership and
universal service based on measures of connecting locations, virtually
precluding wireless providers. This contributed to a bias against wireless
providers and a distortion in the technology choices by providers. Today,
customers' concepts of connection to the network have shifted from
"connection to locations" to "connection to customers themselves."
Customers now demand access across time and space.
In order to successfully achieve the goals of universal service, federal
telecommunications regulation must aim to promote this new type of
connectivity and it must do so in a competitively neutral manner. Given the
already high levels of wireline and wireless penetration, the economic
rationale for any intervention in the telecommunications market is weak;
this means that competitive neutrality should be the dominant regulatory
principle.
Sound universal-service policy, like sound public policy in general,
must be competitively neutral both with respect to technology and firms.
Moreover, without competitive neutrality, consumer choice and
sovereignty is subverted. Otherwise, the path forward will reflect the
political/regulatory perception of universal service, not the underlying
supply-side characteristics of the relevant technologies or the changing
demand-side expectations of connectivity. The ultimate public-policy
mistake is to abandon the fundamental principle of competitive neutrality
and pervert market results in order to achieve a politically expeditious
result.
The recent appointment of three new FCC commissioners provides a
unique opportunity for more economically rational federal policy and
funding mechanisms for universal service.
154. As we noted above, dynamic competitive markets will tend to result in similar
prices for similar services, but those prices may be above the lowest cost providers' prices
for some period of time as the new innovator reaps quasi-rents.
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